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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
NANCY L. KEMP, : 
Petitioner, Appellee, : Case No. 2000431-CA 
and Cross-Appellant, 
v. 
PAUL G. KEMP, 
: Priority No. 15 
Respondent, Appellant, 
and Cross-Appellee. : 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT 
Petitioner/appellee/cross-appellant (herein Nancy) hereby 
replies to the response brief of respondent/appellant/cross-
appellee (herein Paul) as follows. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah's appellate cases uniformly hold that the primary 
purpose of alimony is to maintain both parties, if possible, at 
the same standard of living they enjoyed during the marriage. 
Where Nancy and Paul spent their entire monthly net income in 
support of their lifestyle, the trial court's alimony award 
should have been fashioned in such a way as to maintain that 
marital standard of living. In this case, the parties1 post-
divorce income stream should be roughly equalized so each will be 
able to pursue the standard of living enjoyed during the 
marriage. Paulfs argument for a contrary rule is not supported 
by case law or statute. Moreover, neither precedent nor logic 
v- . 2 
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supports Paul's contention that the duration of Nancy's alimony 
may be properly terminated at half the duration of the parties' 
marriage, especially in light of the 20 years that Nancy did not 
pursue or maintain career employment outside the home by the 
parties' mutual agreement. 
Utah case law also mandates that, absent fraud, retirement 
and 401(k) accounts are to be valued as of the date of the 
divorce decree. There is no basis for the trial court's use of 
an earlier date herein, and although Paul argues to the contrary, 
he has cited no authority to support his contention. 
Because the chart used by Paul to summarize Nancy's 
financial needs was not produced to her until moments before 
trial began, neither Nancy nor her counsel had an opportunity to 
adequately review it for inaccuracies. Given the calculation 
errors contained in Paul's financial declaration, the trial 
court's admission of Paul's chart without prior review unfairly 
prejudiced Nancy. Likewise, the court's refusal to admit the 
"vacation planner" maintained by Paul was unfairly prejudicial. 
The planner was relevant to contrast Paul's "enhanced" post-
separation lifestyle to Nancy's post-separation struggle to live 
within the confines of a sharply reduced income. The "planner" 
was thus relevant to demonstrate the appropriateness of 
equalizing income so that each party could attempt to maintain 
the marital standard of living. Further, the court's rejection 
3 
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of evidence regarding Paul's vested interest in a family trust 
compounded its error by engaging in speculation that Paul's 
income would decrease at the time of his retirement and eliminate 
his ability to pay alimony for the 30-year duration of the 
parties' marriage. 
To suggest that Nancy is not entitled to attorney fees is to 
ignore the trial court's finding that her actual expenses, even 
at her reduced post-separation lifestyle, exceed her income. The 
amount in Nancy's savings account at the time of trial comprised 
nothing more than the amount the parties split at the time of 
separation augmented by a lump sum the court determined Paul owed 
Nancy for certain capital expenses necessitated by the 
separation. Nancy, post-separation, radically curtailed the 
level of spending she had enjoyed during the marriage in order to 
be able to meet the expenses of litigation. The trial court 
should not have penalized her for her sense of fiscal 
responsibility, especially given that Paul challenged neither the 
amount nor the necessity of the fees, that the court found them 
reasonable, and that they were largely incurred due to actions by 
Paul that unnecessarily increased the cost of litigation. 
ARGUMENT 
I. AN ALIMONY AWARD BASED UPON EQUALIZATION OF INCOME 
IS NOT LIMITED TO CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH INCOME IS 
INSUFFICIENT TO MEET BOTH PARTIES' LEGITIMATE NEEDS. 
Williamson v. Williamson, 1999 UT App 219, 983 P.2d 1103, is 
4 
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the sole case Paul cites for his argument that Nancy is not 
entitled to an alimony award sufficient to support the lifestyle 
she enjoyed during the parties1 marriage. In Williamson, the 
Court reviewed a trial court's termination of alimony pursuant to 
a petition to modify. Holding that the same factors for the 
calculation of alimony apply in both initial determinations and 
modifications, this Court stated that the goal of alimony "in 
those cases in which insufficient resources exist to satisfy both 
parties1 legitimate needs" is to equalize not only the parties' 
post-divorce incomes but their respective standards of living. 
Williamson, 1999 UT App 219, Sill (emphasis supplied).1 This 
*Even in a needs-based analysis, Paul's reliance on the 
trial court's findings is at least partially misplaced. He 
suggests that Nancy's budget, by the court's calculation, already 
includes $280 per month for the purchase of a car (see Response 
to Cross-Appeal at 2). However, the court erred both in its 
calculation of a car purchase every six years (see R. 395 at 17, 
1. 19 - 18, 1. 2) and its failure to recognize that, under the 
parties' marital lifestyle, Nancy's 1992 Jeep Cherokee was, by 
the parties' marital practice, overdue for replacement. As Nancy 
testified at trial (see R. 575 at 124, 1. 12 - 125, 1. 8), the 
parties, during the marriage, acquired six cars in addition to 
the Volkswagen Beetle that Paul brought into the marriage. 
Dividing the course of the 30-year marriage by six cars, the 
parties purchased a new car, on average, at least every five 
years. By the time of the divorce, Nancy was entitled to the 
replacement value of her vehicle, nominally set by the court at 
$20,000 (see R. 395 at 17, 11. 14-18). The court's calculation 
of Nancy's car savings expense at only $280 per month was also 
error. At the unchallenged marital standard of a five-year 
replacement average, Nancy's monthly need for savings toward the 
purchase of a car at the nominal value of $20,000.00 is $333.33. 
Moreover, the Court's temporary alimony award did not address the 
short-term savings for a car, consequently denying Nancy the 
accrual of short-term savings for the purchase of a vehicle for 
at least a year-and-a-half. 
5 
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statement acknowledges that the general rule of income 
equalization may not sufficiently address parity in the parties1 
post-divorce lifestyle where resources are inadequate; therefore, 
the additional consideration of equalizing lifestyles comes into 
play. Williamson does not in any way reject the precedent 
established in the cases cited by Nancy from both of Utah's 
appellate courts that at least a rough equalization of income at 
the time of divorce is required. See Brief of Cross-Appellant at 
42-43; see also Griffith v. Griffith, 959 P.2d 1015, 1020 (Utah 
App. 1998), afffd, 1999 UT 78, 985 P.2d 255; Howell v. Howell, 
806 P.2d 1209, 1213 n.3 (Utah App. 1991); Mortensen v. Mortensen, 
760 P.2d 304, 310 (Utah 1988). Paul has not sought to 
distinguish any of these controlling precedents, while at the 
same time he asserts, "There is no basis in law or fact to . . . 
order an equalization of income" (Response to Cross-Appeal at 1). 
Ignoring contrary precedent does not vitiate its applicability. 
As previously established at trial (see Brief of Cross-
Appellant at 21-22), the parties acknowledged their monthly net 
income was consumed in support of the marital lifestyle. In 
light of Paul's failure to present evidence to the contrary, his 
argument that the trial court's inclusion of short-term savings 
in Nancy's legitimate expenses "was purely extra income, and it 
was unjustified" (Response to Cross-Appeal at 2) cannot be 
credited. 
6 
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II. PAUL MISCHARACTERIZES NANCY'S TESTIMONY REGARDING 
PREPAYMENT OF PRINCIPAL ON HER MORTGAGE. 
In addressing the trial court's limitation of alimony to a 
15-year term, Paul claims Nancy argued that she needed to 
accelerate the payment of her mortgage in order to avoid making 
house payments in her retirement years (see Response to Cross-
Appeal at 2). This interpretation misrepresents Nancy's 
testimony. 
Nancy's testimony at trial addressed the parties' lifelong 
marital practice of paying an additional month's principal with 
each mortgage payment. (See R. 575 at 139, 1. 22 - 140, 1. 12; 
176, 1. 12 - 177, 1. 13; 204, 1. 24 - 205, 1. 24). Paul has 
given no citation to the record for his reference to Nancy's 
alleged testimony. However, it is beyond dispute that the reason 
Nancy sought money for additional principal payments on her 
mortgage which was to maintain the parties' marital practice. 
The potential consequence of paying off her mortgage within a 
year after Nancy reaches retirement age is irrelevant to the 
duration of alimony.2 As previously explained, the parties, 
2At the point in time that the parties retire and Nancy's 
mortgage is paid off, Paul might be able to demonstrate a 
material change of circumstances that might justify a potential 
modification of the alimony award. It is purely speculative as 
to when such events might occur or what each of the parties' 
financial circumstances would be at that time. This "crystal 
ball" approach to alimony awards would contravene existing legal 
precedent and encourage divorce litigants to engage in 
"speculative strategies" that waste judicial resources. The 
trial court should not have engaged in such speculation. 
7 
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following the same practice had the marriage continued, would 
also have paid off their mortgage at an accelerated pace, freeing 
the money that would otherwise have been expended on mortgage 
payments for other purposes. Although their financial 
allocations might have changed as a result, their lifestyle, in 
terms of available resources, would not. See Brief of Cross-
Appellant at 24-27. The trial court's termination of alimony on 
the basis of Nancy's speculated mortgage prepayment thus 
inappropriately denies her the right to employ the resources due 
her as she sees fit and denies her the right to pay only the 
actual mortgage payment each month. 
Paul tacitly acknowledges the correctness of this position 
by attempting to apply it to the trial court's refusal to admit 
into evidence his post-separation vacation planner. He argues 
that his "decisions regarding how to spend the money that he 
earned during the period of the parties' separation had no 
bearing on Nancy's legitimate needs" (Response to Cross-Appeal at 
3). What Paul fails to recognize is the distinction between the 
amount of money expended in supporting the marital lifestyle and 
the particulars of its use. Nancy sought to use the vacation 
planner to establish the disparity in the parties' post-
separation lifestyle as compared to the marital lifestyle, not to 
micromanage its particular objects. Paul's apparent objective in 
misrepresenting the purpose of Nancy's principal payments is the 
8 
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opposite: to dictate the timing and objects of Nancy's 
expenditures precisely, allowing for no changes in circumstances 
or needs. Nancy is entitled to financial resources equivalent to 
those available to her during the marriage; this is the purpose 
of alimony. How she chooses to use the alimony to which she is 
entitled, now or in the future, is neither Paul's legitimate 
concern nor a basis for its premature termination. 
III. PAUL'S REPLY BRIEF FAILS TO PROVIDE ANY LEGAL 
PRECEDENT IN SUPPORT OF HIS POSITION. 
Beyond Paul's inaccurate mischaracterization of Williamson 
v. Williamson, 1999 UT App 219, 983 P.2d 1103, Paul has not cited 
any legal authority upon which this court could find in his 
behalf. As such, Paul's remaining arguments are inadequately 
briefed under Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure.3 
For example, as to the chart he used to portray Nancy's 
expenses, Paul has neither stated his grounds for failing to 
provide it to Nancy for review in advance of trial nor cited 
authority showing that its use under these circumstances 
3Under Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, lf[t]he argument shall contain the contentions and 
reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, 
including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in 
the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and 
parts of the record relied on." The brief of the appellee must 
also conform to this requirement. See Utah R. App. P. 24(b). 
Paul's arguments as to the remaining issues do not conform to 
this standard. 
9 
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conformed to established law. As to the court's refusal to admit 
the contested vacation planner, he asserts that "[t]he Court's 
ruling was correct" (Response to Cross-Appeal at 3), but fails to 
cite any authority supporting its decision. With respect to the 
trial court's failure to consider the effect of Paul's vested 
interest in a family trust, he does not address its relevance to 
his continuing ability to pay alimony after his speculated 
retirement.4 He cites no testimony or argument of record on any 
of these points. This abbreviated treatment is inadequate to 
meet his requirement under the rule. 
As to the valuation date issue, Paul cites one case related 
to the appropriate valuation date of the parties' 401(k) and 
retirement accounts, but he fails to respond to the precedents 
cited by Nancy (see Brief of Cross-Appellant at 34) which require 
valuation at the time the decree of divorce is entered. In fact, 
his reliance on Parker v. Parker, 2000 UT App 30, 996 P.2d 565, 
is misplaced. While he claims that Parker stands for the generic 
proposition that courts may exercise considerable discretion in 
4Paul's inheritance is relevant to his continuing ability to 
pay alimony. See Sampinos v. Sampinos, 750 P.2d 615, 618-19 
(Utah App. 1988)(holding "trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in awarding plaintiff alimony from ... defendant's 
full and separate property" in order "to realign the disparity 
between defendant's and plaintiff's standards of living"). Since 
Paul will have received his undisclosed inheritance during the 
pendency of this appeal by virtue of his mother's passing, Paul's 
complete financial picture is not before the Court. 
10 
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determining the financial interests of divorcing parties (see 
Response to Cross-Appeal at 4), he ignores the general rule it 
states of valuing marital assets at the time of the divorce 
decree absent a party's obstructive conduct. Declaring that 
,f[t]here is no basis to disturb the trial court's decision on 
this point" (Response to Cross-Appeal at 4) is a misstatement of 
law.5 
••' 
Finally, with regard to Nancy's claim for attorney's fees, 
Paul has completely ignored the factors spelled out in Bell v. 
Bell, 810 P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1991) and the other cases cited by 
Nancy (see Brief of Cross-Appellant at 35-36). He responds 
neither to Nancy's explanation for the amount of money in her 
savings account at the time of trial (see Brief of Cross-
Appellant at 39-40) nor to the enumeration of his acts that 
resulted in unnecessarily increasing the costs of litigation (see 
Brief of Cross-Appellant at 37-38) . He fails to challenge the 
fees incurred by Nancy as unreasonable or unnecessary and does 
not take issue with Nancy's status as the prevailing party. In 
short, his sole argument is that because Nancy was able to pay 
her fees--due to her curtailment of lifestyle in order to do so— 
5In the recently published opinion of Lieber v. ITT Hartford 
Insurance Center, 2000 UT 72, 403 Utah Adv. Rep., the Utah 
Supreme Court remanded the issue of the prevailing party's 
request for attorney fees, noting that the opposing party's 
citations and legal assertions to the Court on appeal were 
misleading and unfounded. 
11 
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he should escape all liability. This is not the law. 
On numerous occasions Utah's appellate courts have stated 
that 
11
' [A] reviewing court is entitled to have the issues 
clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is 
not simply a depository in which the appealing party 
may dump the burden of argument and research.1" State 
v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988) (quoting 
Williamson v. Opsahl, 92 111. App. 3d 1087, 416 N.E.2d 
783, 784 (111. App. Ct. 1981)) (other citations 
omitted). Furthermore, "it is well established that an 
appellate court will decline to consider an argument 
that a party has failed to adequately brief. Valcarce 
v, Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 313 (Utah 1998 (citations 
omitted); State v Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 
1989); State v. Am.i cone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 
1984). 
State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2, c][ 1 I , 97 4 P. 2d 2 69. Because Paul has 
not met his burden, his arguments on these points need not be 
considered by the Court. 
^ CONCLUSION 
Paul's brief provides little in the way of citation to the 
record or to relevant case law in support of his disagreement 
with Nancy's issues. In fact, he ignores precedents that 
undermine his contentions and engages in generalizations that are 
inapplicable to the facts of record. His inadequate briefing 
gives this Court no ground to credit his conclusions. 
For these reasons, and for the reasons set forth in Nancy's 
opening brief, Nancy respectfully requests the Court to deny 
Paul's appeal and to grant Nancy the relief requested in her 
cross-appeal, including her reasonable costs and attorney fees 
12 
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incurred at trial and on appeal. 
Dated this 
- day of (PJT^C ' 2000. 
Respectfully submitted, 
( -Hr. . Q c• i/. . 
PHILLIP W. DYER 4 
PAMELA C. URRY 
Co-Counsel for Petitioner 
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